Saturday, March 19, 2011

NRC info from the past two weeks related to Browns Ferry, Fleet Feet Huntsville 2011 race calendar, Some recent CRS reports via the Federation of American Scientists

Browns Ferry related NRC docs from the past two weeks

  1. ML110700157 - E-mail from M. Vaaler, NRR to A. Howe, NRR et al. on Plants Submitting Fire Protection OMA Exemption Requests to Extend Enforcement Discretion.
  2. ML110700158 - E-mail from M. Vaaler, NRR to T. Boyce, NRR on DRAFT E-mail to Management Regarding OMA Exemptions.
  3. ML110691285 - E-mail from D. Frumkin, NRR to B. Metzger, NRR FW: Support for Manual Action Exemption Reviews.
  4. ML110691142 - E-mail from P. Lain, NRR to A. Boatright, NRR RE: DRA Action List.
  5. ML110590054 - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Amendment Request to Transition to AREVA Fuel.
  6. ML110610339 - LER 10-004-00 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3, re Manual Reactor Scram Due to High Vibration on the Generator Exciter Inboard and Outboard Journal Bearings.
  7. ML110610739 - Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2 and 3, Information Related to the Safety Significance of the Apparent Violation Concerning Failure of Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System Low Pressure Injection Valve.
  8. ML110600408 - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 2 & 3 - Technical Specification Change TS-429 - Deletion of Low Pressure Coolant Injection Motor-Generator Sets.
  9. ML110610738 - Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3, Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2, Submittal Of Report In Accordance With 10 CFR 26.719(c)(1) for Drug And Alcohol Testing Errors.
  10. ML110590055 - ANP-2988NP, Revision 0, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, AREVA Fuel Transition Input to TVA for RAIs," Enclosure 3.
  11. ML110610737 - Tennessee Valley Authority - Fitness for Duty Annual Program Performance Data, January through December 2010.
  12. ML110670225 - Browns Ferry, Unit 2 - Core Operating Limits Report for Cycle 17 Operation.
  13. ML110630441 - Browns Ferry, Inspection/Activity Plan 03/01/2011 - 06/30/2012.
  14. ML110540131 - Browns Ferry, Units 1 & 2, Sequoyah, 1 & 2, Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2, Request for Additional Information Regarding Cyber Security Plans Based on Nuclear Energy Institute 08-09, Revision 6.
  15. ML110730703 - Brownsferry Nuclear Plant, NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report 05000259-10-502, 05000260-10-502 and 05000296-10-502.
  16. ML110660349 - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Request For Additional Information Regarding Technical Specification Change TS-474 (TAC Nos. ME4668, ME4669, and ME4670).
  17. ML110630427 - Annual Assessment Letter for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (IR 05000259,260,296-11-001).

Fleet Feet Huntsville 2011 race calendar

Here's a link to the most recent collection of CRS reports posted by the Federation of American Scientists in their Secrecy News newsletter...

ScienceCasts: Super Moon

Tonight. The forecast at NWS Huntsville currently says mostly cloudy, so this might be hit or miss...

Friday, March 18, 2011

NRC, INPO, NEI, ANS.....

This information notice was sent out to all operators of nuclear power plants today. The purpose section is the most concise statement of the document:

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of effects of the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake on nuclear power plants in Japan. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

One might presume that this is meaningless since it specifically mentions that "no specific action or written response is required." That's kind of where INPO comes in. While the NRC verifies that nuclear plants comply with the law, INPO (a utility-sponsored entity) is there to measure and improve plant performance to above the minimum requirements of law. Earlier this week, INPO (the link provided only gives very generic information about INPO) sent out guidelines for actions to be taken by all plant operators to be as certain as possible that nuclear plants can deal with postulated disasters. Speaking only from my immediate realm of experience, TVA had already started (prior to INPO's guidance) to form teams to evaluate and improve safety margins from disasters at their nuclear plants. I'm sure that TVA is not alone...

Thursday, March 17, 2011

Update from about 45 minutes ago from the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum and...

Reactor Status Update 11 - NPPs in Fukushima as of 10:00 March 18 - http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1300411879P.pdf



Beagán agus a rá go maith.

Happy St. Patrick's Day!


I'm hoisting a Guinness!

Monday, March 14, 2011

NHK World live stream


Video clips at Ustream

On things nuclear...

I have been affiliated with nuclear power in some form or fashion since 1992. I will say right now that I DO NOT CONSIDER MYSELF AN EXPERT. I DO consider myself to be a highly trained professional. In the course of the nearly twenty years of training and operation of nuclear plants, I can say that I have worked and currently work with some of the most intelligent and genuinely concerned for the public safety folks I have ever met. I thoroughly believe that the operators and plant staff in Japan have identical attributes.

Regarding nuclear plants and their susceptibility to natural disasters, Japan has been presented with a situation that has far exceeded the worst expectations. Even in light of that fact, the consequences of this situation will be nowhere near the consequences of Chernobyl. The three units that have had accidents at Fukushima Daiichi will not operate as they were constructed ever again (if at all). However, as a testament to the courage and ability of the operators in Japan, the damage and contamination (as things stand right now) will very likely be limited to a highly localized area.

A number of human endeavors are fraught with some amount of hazard. There is a risk while driving your vehicle to and from work on a daily basis. Granted, the risk is small and if something goes wrong, the reach of the problem will be extremely limited. A very few examples of industries that have definite human benefits but larger risks follow:

Nuclear power
Natural gas (and associated pipelines, etc.)
Pesticide and other chemical manufacturing
Molasses (I include this in jest, but molasses can kill - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Molasses_Disaster)

In 1984, several thousand lives were lost in Bhopal, India due to a major leak of methyl isocyanate. The long-term effects of Bhopal are still being documented. As with Chernobyl, there were SERIOUS design flaws and human faults that led to people dying. This is emphatically not the case in Japan.

All of this gets me to my main point. I am STILL pro-nuclear power. I want to see the nuclear industry grow and evolve. My current sense of the environment of pro-nuclear entities is that they are wanting to drive ahead with construction and licensing/operation while giving the APPEARANCE of not taking a pause to understand the implications of the disaster in Japan. I know that this is not the case. The lessons of what has happened in Japan already and what will happen until this emergency is over are being considered even as I type this. There will be a lot more to be learned from what has happened. In general, the industry is hesitant to allow for too much delay for further study and evaluation and regulation evolution in small part due to cost and in large part because these are some of the tactics that have been used by anti-nuclear entities to stifle and hold the nuclear power industry in check since Three Mile Island. As an industry, we can't afford to give the appearance of plowing ahead without thinking. As any folks who work in my industry can repeat like a mantra - "Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique". As an industry that I hope to see continue, we need to be straightforward with the public about what actions we are currently taking to prevent similar situations from happening in the United States and the results of the actions we take from the lessons learned from Japan.

Sunday, March 13, 2011