Saturday, March 26, 2011

BFN documents from the NRC and my own silly thoughts...

Just five Browns Ferry documents from the NRC on ADAMS this week:

  1. ML082320531 - Advises that util 881209 response adequately addresses items requested in Generic Ltr 88-11, "NRC Position of Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Matls & Impact on Plant Operations."
  2. ML110740225 - Browns Ferry, Unit 3, Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-11-012.
  3. ML110760012 - Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3, Reply to Request for Regulatory Conference.
  4. ML110810568 - 04/04/11 Notice of Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority to Discuss Safety Significance of One Preliminary Greater Than Green Finding Associated with One Apparent Violation that was Documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000259-01-005, 05000260-10-005.
  5. ML110310453
    Document Title: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Safety Evaluation for Relief Request 2-ISI-43, For The Fourth 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval (TAC NO. ME3721).

Understandably, there's been a great deal of media interest in US nuclear power. To that end, TVA has been getting out their word via executives and an unusually deep tour of Browns Ferry yesterday. I see/hear words like "our safety is assured" and "no way" regarding eventes like those in Japan. While this is probably technically very true (a magnitude 9.0 quake followed by a multi-story wall of water), I would NEVER BE BOLD ENOUGH to make guarantees. Mother Nature can be very surprising.

The analyses regarding our safety are based on probability. I believe that the analyses and engineering that were performed to address potential problems were sound. I also know that some of these analyses undergo periodic re-evaluation (e.g. Earthquake Risk in the Central and Eastern United States). Occasionally, new issues come to light. These are then evaluated and addressed according to the potential impact they have on safe operation. Though the possibility of a beyond design earthquake and/or a large flooding event (particularly in conjunction with each other) is HIGHLY UNLIKELY in our next twenty years of operation, we (and the rest of the industry) are looking into such events. When combined with post-9/11 evaluations/actions/modifications and the amazing level of training (this is the Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Licensed BWR operators) for both licensed AND non-licensed operators, I believe that we would be able to deal with most issues (even beyond our design). Hopefully, we won't be challenged with anything approaching that level of destructive capacity...

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